Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence
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Publication:3713895
DOI10.2307/1884639zbMath0586.90108OpenAlexW1969028417MaRDI QIDQ3713895
B. Douglas Bernheim, Michael D. Whinston
Publication date: 1986
Published in: The Quarterly Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/1884639
Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
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