Justifiable Beliefs in Sequential Equilibrium

DOI10.2307/1912659zbMath0587.90103OpenAlexW2078533237MaRDI QIDQ3714931

Andrew McLennan

Publication date: 1985

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/1912659

zbMATH Keywords

extensive form gamesequential equilibriumjustifiability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10)

Related Items (12)

Acceptable and predominant correlated equilibria ⋮ Strategic irrationality in extensive games ⋮ Forward induction reasoning and correct beliefs ⋮ Credible negotiation statements and coherent plans ⋮ Consistent conditional systems in noncooperative game theory ⋮ Forward induction equilibrium ⋮ Refining cheap-talk equilibria ⋮ Limited focus in dynamic games ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ Strong forward induction ⋮ Backward induction versus forward induction reasoning ⋮ Computation of equilibria in noncooperative games

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