An Axiomatization of Harsanyi's Nontransferable Utility Solution
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Publication:3716863
DOI10.2307/1913209zbMath0588.90102OpenAlexW2069750432MaRDI QIDQ3716863
Publication date: 1985
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/papers/573.pdf
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