When Are Nash Equilibria Independent of the Distribution of Agents' Characteristics?
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Publication:3718448
DOI10.2307/2297742zbMath0589.90017OpenAlexW2085680383MaRDI QIDQ3718448
Theodore C. Bergstrom, Hal R. Varian
Publication date: 1985
Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/3rn170cf
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