A bargaining theory of the firm

DOI10.1007/s00199-012-0721-3zbMath1281.91108OpenAlexW2138019333MaRDI QIDQ372367

Volker Britz, P. Jean-Jacques Herings, Arkadi Predtetchinski

Publication date: 7 October 2013

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/ws/files/64767744/herings_2013_a_bargaining_theory_of_the_firm.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

equilibriumstock marketincompletenessnoncooperative bargainingside-paymentsproduction plantransfer scheme

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Special types of economic equilibria (91B52) Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (2)

Nonexistence of constrained efficient production plans ⋮ General economic equilibrium with financial markets and retainability

Cites Work

• A general equilibrium analysis of corporate control and the stock market
• Bargaining in committees as an extension of Nash's bargaining theory
• Generic inefficiency of stock market equilibrium when markets are incomplete
• Ownership structure and control in incomplete market economies with transferable utility
• On the objective of firms under uncertainty with stock markets
• The existence of equilibrium in incomplete markets and the objective function of the firm
• Incomplete markets over an infinite horizon: Long-lived securities and speculative bubbles
• Non-cooperative support for the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution
• Voting in assemblies of shareholders and incomplete markets
• Majority Voting and Corporate Control: The Rule of the Dominant Shareholder
• Power and Taxes
• A Theory of Competitive Equilibrium in Stock Market Economies
• Nonexistence of Constrained Efficient Equilibria When Markets are Incomplete
• Convex Analysis
• Bargaining and Value

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