Approximation results for discontinuous games with an application to equilibrium refinement
DOI10.1007/s00199-012-0727-xzbMath1294.91016OpenAlexW2089297166MaRDI QIDQ372370
Richard P. McLean, Oriol Carbonell-Nicolau
Publication date: 7 October 2013
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.sas.rutgers.edu/virtual/snde/wp/2011-28.pdf
equilibrium refinementfinite approximationdiscontinuous gamelimit-of-finite perfect equilibriumNash equilibrium correspondencetrembling-hand perfect equilibrium
Noncooperative games (91A10) Games involving topology, set theory, or logic (91A44) (n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)
Related Items (10)
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Approximation results for discontinuous games with an application to equilibrium refinement
- On the existence of pure-strategy perfect equilibrium in discontinuous games
- Strategic approximations of discontinuous games
- On equilibrium existence in payoff secure games
- Understanding some recent existence results for discontinuous games
- Equilibrium existence and approximation of regular discontinuous games
- Approximations of Nash equilibria
- Variational convergence: approximation and existence of equilibria in discontinuous games
- Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
- Essential equilibria of \(n\)-person noncooperative games
- Strategically stable equilibria in games with infinitely many pure strategies
- Existence of an equilibrium in first price auctions
- The existence of perfect equilibrium in discontinuous games
- Perfect and limit admissible perfect equilibria in discontinuous games
- Perfect equilibrium in games with compact action spaces
- The Existence of Equilibrium in Discontinuous Economic Games, I: Theory
- Games with Discontinuous Payoffs
- On the Existence of Pure and Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibria in Discontinuous Games
- Closure and upper semicontinuity results in mathematical programming, Nash and economic equilibria1
- Equilibrium Refinement for Infinite Normal-Form Games
- Games With Discontinuous Payoffs: A Strengthening of Reny's Existence Theorem
- Reciprocal Upper Semicontinuity and Better Reply Secure Games: A Comment
This page was built for publication: Approximation results for discontinuous games with an application to equilibrium refinement