Information acquisition in conflicts
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Publication:372372
DOI10.1007/S00199-012-0710-6zbMath1295.91052OpenAlexW2107380278MaRDI QIDQ372372
Florian Morath, Johannes Münster
Publication date: 7 October 2013
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://bibliothek.wzb.eu/pdf/2009/ii09-10.pdf
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Economics of information (91B44)
Related Items (7)
Simple equilibria in general contests ⋮ Optimal disclosure in all-pay auctions with interdependent valuations ⋮ Information acquisition during a descending auction ⋮ Volunteering and the strategic value of ignorance ⋮ The value of public information in common-value Tullock contests ⋮ A tug-of-war team contest ⋮ The value of information in asymmetric all-pay auctions
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- Difference-form contests and the robustness of all-pay auctions
- Volunteering and the strategic value of ignorance
- Information Acquisition in Auctions
- Investment under Uncertainty in Dynamic Conflicts
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