A full characterization of Nash implementation with strategy space reduction
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Publication:372374
DOI10.1007/s00199-012-0714-2zbMath1284.91023OpenAlexW2166272227MaRDI QIDQ372374
Michele Lombardi, Naoki Yoshihara
Publication date: 7 October 2013
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/ws/files/1047084/guid-772fc7b3-62d5-45d5-9403-42260194af5b-ASSET1.0.pdf
Related Items (10)
Incentive compatibility under ambiguity ⋮ Implementation in partial equilibrium ⋮ Nash implementation via simple stochastic mechanisms: strategy space reduction ⋮ Natural implementation with semi-responsible agents in pure exchange economies ⋮ One-step-ahead implementation ⋮ Partially-honest Nash implementation: a full characterization ⋮ Treading a fine line: (im)possibilities for Nash implementation with partially-honest individuals ⋮ Nash implementation via mechanisms that allow for abstentions ⋮ Constrained implementation ⋮ Nash implementation in production economies with unequal skills: a characterization
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