Ms. Machiavelli and the Stable Matching Problem
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Publication:3727681
DOI10.2307/2323645zbMath0595.90004OpenAlexW4235287133MaRDI QIDQ3727681
Publication date: 1985
Published in: The American Mathematical Monthly (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2323645
Cooperative games (91A12) Edge subsets with special properties (factorization, matching, partitioning, covering and packing, etc.) (05C70) Social choice (91B14)
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