On the complexity of Pareto-optimal Nash and strong equilibria

DOI10.1007/s00224-012-9433-0zbMath1282.91025OpenAlexW2034471979MaRDI QIDQ372955

Alexander Skopalik, Martin Hoefer

Publication date: 21 October 2013

Published in: Theory of Computing Systems (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00224-012-9433-0

zbMATH Keywords

computational complexityNash equilibriumPareto optimalitynoncooperative gamescongestion gamesstrong equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10)

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Cites Work

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