On the Welfare Analysis of Rational Expectations Equilibria with Asymmetric Information

DOI10.2307/1911721zbMath0598.90020OpenAlexW1979702490MaRDI QIDQ3734126

Jean-Jacques Laffont

Publication date: 1985

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/1911721

zbMATH Keywords

asymmetric informationwelfare analysiscommunication constraintsincentive compatible mechanismsRational expectations equilibria

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

General equilibrium theory (91B50) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (10)

Equilibrium concepts in differential information economies ⋮ Dynamic noisy rational expectations equilibrium with insider information: welfare and regulation ⋮ Information acquisition and welfare effect in a model of competitive financial markets ⋮ Welfare analysis of a market with pairwise meetings and asymmetric information ⋮ Learning over the business cycle: policy implications ⋮ Rational expectations equilibrium and the strategic choice of costly information ⋮ Efficient implementation with interdependent valuations and maxmin agents ⋮ Endogenous probabilities and the information revealed by prices ⋮ Partially-revealing rational expectations equilibrium in a competitive economy ⋮ Another look at the Radner--Stiglitz nonconcavity in the value of information.

This page was built for publication: On the Welfare Analysis of Rational Expectations Equilibria with Asymmetric Information