Two remarks on Cournot equilibria

DOI10.1016/0165-1765(85)90091-6zbMath1273.91291OpenAlexW2124218767MaRDI QIDQ373787

Theodore C. Bergstrom, Hal R. Varian

Publication date: 25 October 2013

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/25786

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

General equilibrium theory (91B50)

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Cites Work

• When Are Nash Equilibria Independent of the Distribution of Agents' Characteristics?
• A Theory of 'Oil'Igopoly: Cournot Equilibrium in Exhaustible Resource Markets with Fixed Supplies
• Product Selection, Fixed Costs, and Monopolistic Competition

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