Independent social choice correspondences are dictatorial

DOI10.1016/0165-1765(85)90092-8zbMath1273.91147OpenAlexW2042555945MaRDI QIDQ373789

Vincenzo Denicolò

Publication date: 25 October 2013

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(85)90092-8

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Social choice (91B14)

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Cites Work

• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• The equivalence of strong positive association and strategy-proofness
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Unnamed Item