The approximate purification of mixed strategies with finite observation sets

DOI10.1016/0165-1765(85)90008-4zbMath1273.91024OpenAlexW2003499521MaRDI QIDQ373802

Salim Rashid

Publication date: 25 October 2013

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(85)90008-4

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05)

Related Items (3)

Pure strategies in games with private information ⋮ The Shapley-Folkman theorem and the range of a bounded measure: an elementary and unified treatment ⋮ Non-cooperative games on hyperfinite Loeb spaces

Cites Work

• Approximate Purification of Mixed Strategies
• Private Information and Pure-Strategy Equilibria
• Measures of the non-convexity of sets and the Shapley–Folkman–Starr theorem
• Elimination of Randomization in Certain Statistical Decision Procedures and Zero-Sum Two-Person Games

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