Bargaining Power, Fear of Disagreement, and Wage Settlements: Theory and Evidence from U.S. Industry

DOI10.2307/1912322zbMath0603.90018OpenAlexW3123017856WikidataQ63688258 ScholiaQ63688258MaRDI QIDQ3740501

Jan Svejnar

Publication date: 1986

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/1912322

zbMATH Keywords

labor marketbargaining powerwage determinationfear of disagreementunion-nonunion wage differentials

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38)

Related Items (13)

Unionized oligopoly, labor-management cooperation, and international competitiveness ⋮ Non-nested tests of efficient bargain and labour demand models ⋮ The relative profitability of Nash bargaining on the labour demand curve or the contract curve ⋮ Insiders and outsiders in labour market models ⋮ Wage discrimination and antidiscrimination policy in unionized industries ⋮ Negotiation-sequence, pricing, and ordering decisions in a three-echelon supply chain: a coopetitive-game analysis ⋮ A theory of agreements in the shadow of conflict: The genesis of bargaining power ⋮ The codetermined firm in oligopoly ⋮ The representative Nash solution for two-sided bargaining problems ⋮ Bargaining in a multi-echelon supply chain with power structure: KS solution vs. Nash solution ⋮ An axiomatization of the weighted NTU value ⋮ Efficient bargaining with underutilization of labor ⋮ Fear of ruin

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