Rank-Order Contracts for a Principal with Many Agents

DOI10.2307/2297720zbMath0604.90040OpenAlexW2164245768MaRDI QIDQ3741353

James M. Malcomson

Publication date: 1986

Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2297720

zbMATH Keywords

incentive compatibleprincipal with many agentsrank-order contract

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Mathematical economics (91B99)

Related Items (7)

Simple equilibria in general contests ⋮ Reciprocity in the principal-multiple agent model ⋮ All-or-nothing payments ⋮ (In)efficient public-goods provision through contests ⋮ Tournaments with gaps ⋮ Information in tournaments under limited liability ⋮ Asymptotic efficiency of the proportional compensation scheme for a large number of producers

This page was built for publication: Rank-Order Contracts for a Principal with Many Agents