A Sequential Solution to the Public Goods Problem

DOI10.2307/1911725zbMath0605.90010OpenAlexW2009116384MaRDI QIDQ3743038

Jacques Crémer, Michael H. Riordan

Publication date: 1985

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/1911725

zbMATH Keywords

sequential solutionimperfect information about preferencesimplementing an optimal provision of public goodsStackelberg truthful (SST) mechanism

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Hierarchical systems (93A13) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Social choice (91B14)

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