Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers
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Publication:3743062
DOI10.2307/1913516zbMath0605.90043OpenAlexW2066809750MaRDI QIDQ3743062
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Publication date: 1984
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/64010
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