An Approach to Communication Equilibria
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Publication:3743995
DOI10.2307/1914304zbMath0605.90146OpenAlexW2160912374MaRDI QIDQ3743995
Publication date: 1986
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/62564160dfa106ee4903a1f0663a2eca4e469c22
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