Manipulation of nonimposed, nonoligarchic, nonbinary group decision rules
From MaRDI portal
Publication:374731
DOI10.1016/0165-1765(83)90164-7zbMath1273.91109OpenAlexW2004919432MaRDI QIDQ374731
Publication date: 24 October 2013
Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(83)90164-7
Related Items (4)
Strategyproof social choice when preferences and outcomes may contain ties ⋮ Set-monotonicity implies Kelly-strategyproofness ⋮ Coalitionally strategy-proof social choice correspondences and the Pareto rule ⋮ Weak strategy proofness: The case of nonbinary social choice functions
Cites Work
- Coalitional manipulation and the Pareto rule
- Threats, counter-threats and strategic manipulation for non-binary group decision rules
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- Manipulation of social decision functions
- Intransitive social indifference and the Arrow dilemma
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
This page was built for publication: Manipulation of nonimposed, nonoligarchic, nonbinary group decision rules
