Tests of a heterogeneous bidders theory of first price auctions
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Publication:374816
DOI10.1016/0165-1765(83)90039-3zbMath1273.91209OpenAlexW2009430463MaRDI QIDQ374816
Vernon L. Smith, James M. Walker, James C. Cox
Publication date: 24 October 2013
Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(83)90039-3
Related Items (10)
Ambiguity aversion in first-price sealed-bid auctions ⋮ The discrete bid first auction ⋮ Behavioral mechanism design: evidence from the modified first-price auctions ⋮ Robust inference in first-price auctions: overbidding as an identifying restriction ⋮ English versus Vickrey auctions with loss-averse bidders ⋮ Informed entry in auctions ⋮ Behavioral models for first-price sealed-bid auctions with the one-shot decision theory ⋮ Heterogeneous bids in auctions with rational and boundedly rational bidders: theory and experiment ⋮ The beauty of Dutch: bidding behavior in combinatorial first-price procurement auctions ⋮ Individual behavior of first-price auctions: the importance of information feedback in computerized experimental markets
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