Multivalued decision rules and coalitional nonmanipulability. Two possibility theorems

DOI10.1016/0165-1765(83)90008-3zbMath1273.91110OpenAlexW1501792755MaRDI QIDQ374843

Taradas Bandyopadhyay

Publication date: 24 October 2013

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(83)90008-3

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06)

Related Items (4)

Vote swapping in irresolute two-tier voting procedures ⋮ Characterizing the top cycle via strategyproofness ⋮ Set-monotonicity implies Kelly-strategyproofness ⋮ Coalitionally strategy-proof social choice correspondences and the Pareto rule

Cites Work

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• Limited resoluteness and strategic voting: The case of linear sincere preference orderings
• On a class of strictly nonmanipulable collective choice rules
• Strategic voting under minimally binary group decision functions
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• Manipulation of social choice functions
• On Schwartz's rule
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Strategy-Proofness and Social Choice Functions without Singlevaluedness

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