Rotating credit collusion in repeated auctions with a single buyer and several sellers

DOI10.1016/0165-1765(84)90133-2zbMath1273.91208OpenAlexW2079382796MaRDI QIDQ374958

Soo Hong Chew, Mei Hui Mao, Stanley S. Reynolds

Publication date: 24 October 2013

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(84)90133-2

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• Collusive behaviour in finite repeated games with bonding
• Collusive behavior in noncooperative epsilon-equilibria of oligopolies with long but finite lives

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