Smooth versus discontinuous mechanisms

DOI10.1016/0165-1765(84)90169-1zbMath1273.91140OpenAlexW1988898872MaRDI QIDQ374987

Stefan Reichelstein

Publication date: 24 October 2013

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(84)90169-1

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Related Items (4)

Nash implementation of the Lindahl performance in economies with just two consumers: an impossibility result ⋮ Dynamic implementation in two-agent economies ⋮ A feasible Nash implementation of Walrasian equilibria in the two-agent economy ⋮ Regular equilibria and negative welfare implications in delegation games

Cites Work

• Outcome Functions Yielding Walrasian and Lindahl Allocations at Nash Equilibrium Points
• Unnamed Item

This page was built for publication: Smooth versus discontinuous mechanisms