Repeated principal-agent relationships with lending and borrowing

DOI10.1016/0165-1765(85)90121-1zbMath1273.91257OpenAlexW2031158619MaRDI QIDQ375019

Franklin Allen

Publication date: 24 October 2013

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(85)90121-1

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Related Items

Markov-perfect risk sharing, moral hazard and limited commitment, Non-exclusive dynamic contracts, competition, and the limits of insurance, On the robustness of Laissez-Faire, Insurance contracts and financial markets, A solvable continuous time dynamic principal-agent model, On the first-order approach in principal-agent models with hidden borrowing and lending, Short-term contracts and long-term agency relationships, Dynamic mechanism design with hidden income and hidden actions, Income fluctuation and asymmetric information: An example of a repeated principal-agent problem, Optimal liquidity policy with shadow banking, A NOTE ON THE ROBUSTNESS OF THE TOBIN EFFECT IN INCOMPLETE MARKETS, Money and dynamic credit arrangements with private information, Retained earnings, interest rates and lending relationship, Default and efficient debt markets.

Cites Work

• Repeated insurance contracts and moral hazard
• A law of large numbers in the theory of consumer's choice under uncertainty
• Monitoring Cooperative Agreements in a Repeated Principal-Agent Relationship
• Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs