Testing in Models of Asymmetric Information

DOI10.2307/2297516zbMath0609.90012OpenAlexW1964853564MaRDI QIDQ3750445

David S. Scharfstein, Barry Nalebuff

Publication date: 1987

Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2297516

zbMATH Keywords

asymmetric informationtestingadverse selectionlabour marketfull-information competitive equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

General equilibrium theory (91B50)

Related Items (3)

Contracting to compete for flows ⋮ Optimal adaptive testing: Informativeness and incentives ⋮ On monitoring and collusion in hierarchies

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