First Mover Disadvantages with Private Information

DOI10.2307/2297517zbMath0609.90018OpenAlexW2017277097MaRDI QIDQ3750449

Esther Gal-Or

Publication date: 1987

Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2297517

zbMATH Keywords

private informationstochastic environmentleader-follower gameoutput quantities as strategiesStackleberg

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economic growth models (91B62) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Probabilistic games; gambling (91A60)

Related Items (12)

Bilateral information sharing in a supply chain with manufacturer competition ⋮ STRATEGIC DELEGATION IN A STACKELBERG GAME WITH MULTIPLE STAGES ⋮ Retailers' endogenous sequencing game and information acquisition game in the presence of information leakage ⋮ Entry and espionage with noisy signals ⋮ A supply chain member should set its margin later if another member's cost is highly uncertain ⋮ Second mover disadvantages in a three-player Stackelberg game with private information ⋮ One-leader and multiple-follower Stackelberg games with private information ⋮ Strategic capability investments and competition for supply contracts ⋮ Competitive capacity expansion under demand uncertainty ⋮ Flexibility in a Stackelberg leadership with differentiated goods ⋮ Information advantage in Cournot oligopoly ⋮ The impact of asymmetric information on entry deterrence: An example

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