Perfect Nash equilibria in finite repeated game and uniqueness of Nash equilibrium in the constituent game

DOI10.1016/0165-1765(85)90250-2zbMath1273.91054OpenAlexW2038156579MaRDI QIDQ375071

Michel Moreaux

Publication date: 24 October 2013

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(85)90250-2

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

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Finite rationalizability and cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma ⋮ Folk theorems for the observable implications of repeated games

Cites Work

• Collusive behavior in noncooperative epsilon-equilibria of oligopolies with long but finite lives
• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games