Competition and information acquisition in first price auctions

DOI10.1016/0165-1765(85)90166-1zbMath1273.91218OpenAlexW2059489166MaRDI QIDQ375098

Tom K. Lee

Publication date: 24 October 2013

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(85)90166-1

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items

A common value auction model with endogeneous entry and information acquisition ⋮ Communication of preferences in contests for contracts ⋮ Information acquisition in auctions: Sealed bids vs. open bids ⋮ Auction design with costly preference elicitation

Cites Work

• The value of information in a sealed-bid auction
• Incomplete Information, High-Low Bidding and Public Information in First Price Auctions
• Rational Expectations, Information Acquisition, and Competitive Bidding
• A Bidding Model of Perfect Competition