On Bayesian Implementable Allocations
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Publication:3751320
DOI10.2307/2297511zbMath0611.90020OpenAlexW2286842536MaRDI QIDQ3751320
Sanjay Srivastava, Thomas R. Palfrey
Publication date: 1987
Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170912-132538243
Nash equilibriaincomplete informationrational expectations equilibriumsocial choice correspondenceLindahl allocationsBayesian implementable
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