Mathematical Analysis of the Interactions Between Oligopolistic Firms and a Competitive Fringe

DOI10.1080/01966324.1987.10737212zbMath0619.90008OpenAlexW2331646433WikidataQ58258714 ScholiaQ58258714MaRDI QIDQ3757650

Hanif D. Sherali, Allen L. Soyster, Frederic H. Murphy

Publication date: 1987

Published in: American Journal of Mathematical and Management Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1080/01966324.1987.10737212

zbMATH Keywords

market structureoligopolyStackelberg gamecompetitive fringeleader- followercomputation of Nash-Cournot equilibriafollower-follower

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) General equilibrium theory (91B50)

Related Items (1)

Convergence analysis and algorithmic implications of two dynamic processes toward an oligopoly-competitive fringe equilibrium solution

Cites Work

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• Expectations and stability in oligopoly models
• Non-cooperative games
• Mathematical Optimization and Economic Theory
• Sequential Equilibria
• A mathematical programming approach for determining oligopolistic market equilibrium
• A New Proof of the Existence and Uniqueness of the Cournot Equilibrium
• Refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept

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