Samurai Accountant: A Theory of Auditing and Plunder

DOI10.2307/2297481zbMath0627.90005OpenAlexW2050379411MaRDI QIDQ3763855

Kim C. Border, Joel Sobel

Publication date: 1987

Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2297481

zbMATH Keywords

auditing procedurerisk neutral agentrisk neutral principal

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Utility theory (91B16)

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