Reputation in the Simultaneous Play of Multiple Opponents

DOI10.2307/2297482zbMath0628.90009OpenAlexW2068471093MaRDI QIDQ3765522

Drew Fudenberg, David M. Kreps

Publication date: 1987

Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/64014

zbMATH Keywords

sequential equilibriummarket entry

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (4)

Multiple rounds in a chain store game ⋮ Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information: characterization and existence ⋮ When is reputation bad? ⋮ Delaying or deterring entry. A game-theoretic analysis

This page was built for publication: Reputation in the Simultaneous Play of Multiple Opponents