Accessibility and stability of the coalition structure core
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Publication:376722
DOI10.1007/s00186-013-0439-4zbMath1275.91013OpenAlexW2057486112MaRDI QIDQ376722
Sylvain Béal, Eric Rémila, Philippe Solal
Publication date: 19 November 2013
Published in: Mathematical Methods of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00186-013-0439-4
accessibilitysimple gamesexcess functioncoalition structure corecore stabilityoutsider independent dominationpayoff configurationveto player
Related Items (5)
On the characterizations of viable proposals ⋮ Stability properties of the core in a generalized assignment problem ⋮ Paths to stability for overlapping group structures ⋮ The equivalence of the minimal dominant set and the myopic stable set for coalition function form games ⋮ The Myopic Stable Set for Social Environments
Cites Work
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- Viable Proposals
- Core Stability of Minimum Coloring Games
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