Markets as Constraints: Multilateral Incentive Compatibility in Continuum Economies

DOI10.2307/2297566zbMath0635.90005OpenAlexW2004833047MaRDI QIDQ3775278

Peter J. Hammond

Publication date: 1987

Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2297566

zbMATH Keywords

Pareto efficient allocationshidden tradesmultilateral compatibilitymultilaterally incentive compatibleprivately informed agentssymmetric allocation in a continuum

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

General equilibrium theory (91B50) Social choice (91B14)

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Tax systems and direct mechanisms in large finite economies ⋮ Non-exclusive dynamic contracts, competition, and the limits of insurance ⋮ Anonymity and individual risk ⋮ Continuum economies with finite coalitions: Core, equilibria, and widespread externalities ⋮ Insurance contracts and financial markets ⋮ Markets and contracts ⋮ Implementation Theory ⋮ Designing a strategyproof spot market mechanism with many traders: twenty-two steps to Walrasian equilibrium ⋮ Peter J. Hammond

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