scientific article
From MaRDI portal
Publication:3775284
zbMath0635.90014MaRDI QIDQ3775284
Publication date: 1984
Title: zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
information measurementwinner's curseunderbiddingdiscriminatory auctionsEquilibrium bidding functions
Related Items (26)
A common value auction model with endogeneous entry and information acquisition ⋮ Optimal research for Cournot oligopolists ⋮ Ex-post full surplus extraction, straightforwardly ⋮ The value of information for auctioneers ⋮ Mid-auction information acquisition ⋮ Learning rivals' information in interdependent value auctions ⋮ Information concentration in common value environments ⋮ On the profitability of reducing competition in all-pay auctions with risk averse bidders ⋮ Auctions with flexible information acquisition ⋮ Information acquisition and full surplus extraction ⋮ Efficient mechanisms with information acquisition ⋮ Mechanism design with general ex-ante investments ⋮ Unraveling in first-price auction. ⋮ Symmetric bidding in second-price, common-value auctions ⋮ Peaches, lemons, and cookies: designing auction markets with dispersed information ⋮ Bargaining with endogenous information ⋮ Industry concentration in common value auctions: theory and evidence ⋮ Multidimensional private value auctions ⋮ Banning bidders from all-pay auctions ⋮ Auctions with costly information acquisition ⋮ Information acquisition in auctions: Sealed bids vs. open bids ⋮ Private information revelation in common-value auctions ⋮ Why a simple second-price auction induces efficient endogenous entry ⋮ Optimal auctions with information acquisition ⋮ Harmful competition in all-pay auctions ⋮ Partial pooling at the reserve price in auctions with resale opportunities
This page was built for publication:
