On Repeated Moral Hazard with Discounting
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Publication:3780710
DOI10.2307/2297484zbMath0639.90013OpenAlexW1996634090MaRDI QIDQ3780710
Sanjay Srivastava, Stephan E. Spear
Publication date: 1987
Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/7fc8aba59bd6c81c6c03adfd8d4738843439b7a0
discountingoptimal contractsrepeated moral hazardconditional discounted expected utilityinfinitely repeated agency modelstatic variational problem
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