A Refinement of Sequential Equilibrium

DOI10.2307/1913561zbMath0641.90095OpenAlexW2072603658MaRDI QIDQ3783105

In-Koo Cho

Publication date: 1987

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/1913561

zbMATH Keywords

extensive form gamessequential equilibriumforward induction equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10)

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