Timing of messages and the Aumann conjecture: a multiple-selves approach

DOI10.1007/s00182-012-0323-0zbMath1285.91020OpenAlexW2050653639WikidataQ122927839 ScholiaQ122927839MaRDI QIDQ378321

Ro'i Zultan

Publication date: 11 November 2013

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://in.bgu.ac.il/en/humsos/Econ/Workingpapers/1109.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriumcoordination gamesmultiple selvespre-play communication

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Related Items (2)

A note on pre-play communication ⋮ Believing when credible: talking about future intentions and past actions

Cites Work

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