Information elicitation and sequential mechanisms

DOI10.1007/s00182-012-0346-6zbMath1281.91113OpenAlexW2092002824MaRDI QIDQ378333

Rann Smorodinsky, Inbar Aricha

Publication date: 11 November 2013

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-012-0346-6

zbMATH Keywords

mechanism designrevelation principleinformation elicitationsequential mechanism

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Noncooperative games (91A10) Applications of game theory (91A80) Economics of information (91B44)

Related Items (1)

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Cites Work

• Optimal voting schemes with costly information acquisition
• Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems
• Sequential voting with abstention
• Overcoming free riding in multi-party computations -- the anonymous case
• Non-cooperative computation: Boolean functions with correctness and exclusivity
• Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal
• Multistage Games with Communication
• Committee Design with Endogenous Information

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