Structural Consistency, Consistency, and Sequential Rationality

DOI10.2307/1913559zbMath0642.90108OpenAlexW1991225170MaRDI QIDQ3783865

Garey Ramey, David M. Kreps

Publication date: 1987

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/1913559

zbMATH Keywords

extensive form gamesequential equilibriumstrategy profileperfect Nash equilibriumconsistent beliefs

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10)

Related Items (16)

A revelation principle for correlated equilibrium under trembling-hand perfection ⋮ A non-cooperative bargaining theory with incomplete information: verifiable types ⋮ Subjective reasoning -- solutions ⋮ Lexicographic expected utility without completeness ⋮ On rationalizability in extensive games ⋮ Independence on relative probability spaces and consistent assessments in game trees ⋮ AGM-consistency and perfect Bayesian equilibrium. I: Definition and properties ⋮ Perfect regular equilibrium ⋮ Lexicographic agreeing to disagree and perfect equilibrium ⋮ Backward induction in games without perfect recall ⋮ An overview of lexicographic choice under uncertainty ⋮ On the non-existence of a rationality definition for extensive games ⋮ An elementary proof that additive i-likelihood characterizes the supports of consistent assessments ⋮ On self-enforcement in extensive-form games ⋮ State-independent subjective expected lexicographic utility ⋮ Rationalizable partition-confirmed equilibrium with heterogeneous beliefs

This page was built for publication: Structural Consistency, Consistency, and Sequential Rationality