Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation
From MaRDI portal
Publication:3787745
DOI10.2307/1912698zbMath0644.90011OpenAlexW2016995324WikidataQ55970604 ScholiaQ55970604MaRDI QIDQ3787745
Oliver D. Hart, John Hardman Moore
Publication date: 1988
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/1912698
Related Items (39)
Co-investment deterrence ⋮ Efficient investment through renegotiation of simple contracts ⋮ Coordinating research and development efforts for quality improvement along a supply chain ⋮ Hard evidence and mechanism design ⋮ Customized transportation, equity participation, and cooperation performance within logistics supply chains ⋮ Coordination of collective actions by using the Stackelberg strategy ⋮ Holdups and holdouts: what do they have in common? ⋮ Investments and the holdup problem in a matching market ⋮ Contractual solutions to hold-up problems with quality uncertainty and unobservable investments ⋮ Efficient investments in the implementation problem ⋮ Contractual flexibility, firm effort, and subsidy design: a comparison of PPP project contracts ⋮ Disclosing products' freshness level as a non-contractible quality: optimal logistics service contracts in the fresh products supply chain ⋮ ENTREPRENEUR–INVESTOR INFORMATION DESIGN ⋮ Quantum contracts between Schrödinger and a cat ⋮ Optimal delegation and information transmission under limited awareness ⋮ The optimal design of rewards in contests ⋮ On efficient firm formation ⋮ Markets and contracts ⋮ Optimal limited authority for principal ⋮ Exit options in incomplete contracts with asymmetric information ⋮ Incomplete Contract, Transaction-Specific Investment, and Bargaining Power ⋮ Optimal pricing against a simple learning rule ⋮ The revelation approach to Nash implementation ⋮ Contract adjustment under uncertainty ⋮ Evidence disclosure and verifiability ⋮ The management of innovation: experimental evidence ⋮ Contracting for technology improvement: the effect of asymmetric bargaining power and investment uncertainty ⋮ A Nobel Prize for property rights theory ⋮ Mutually acceptable courses of action ⋮ The interaction of implicit and explicit contracts in repeated agency ⋮ After you Sir. Hold-up, direct externalities, and sequential investment ⋮ Two-sided unobservable investment, bargaining, and efficiency ⋮ Incomplete contracts versus communication ⋮ Can a contract solve hold-up when investments have externalities? A comment on De Fraja (1999) ⋮ Theory of quantum games and quantum economic behavior ⋮ Bargaining power and renegotiation of small private debt contracts ⋮ The renegotiation-proofness principle and costly renegotiation ⋮ Contract and game theory: basic concepts for settings with finite horizons ⋮ Holdup and innovation
This page was built for publication: Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation
