Finite Rationality and Interpersonal Complexity in Repeated Games
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Publication:3792515
DOI10.2307/1911078zbMath0647.90104OpenAlexW2037162518MaRDI QIDQ3792515
Ehud Kalai, William G. Stanford
Publication date: 1988
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/papers/679.pdf
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