Unique Implementation of Incentive Contracts with Many Agents

DOI10.2307/2297405zbMath0649.90011OpenAlexW2026824501MaRDI QIDQ3795443

Ching-To Ma

Publication date: 1988

Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2297405

zbMATH Keywords

multiple equilibriaimplementationprincipalmany agentsunique perfect equilibriumfirst-bestmulti-stage mechanismsecond-best perfect Bayesian equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

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