Contract Renegotiation and Coasian Dynamics
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Publication:3795449
DOI10.2307/2297403zbMath0649.90024OpenAlexW2020454534MaRDI QIDQ3795449
Publication date: 1988
Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/63320
long-term relationshipsellerbuyerhidden-information principal-agent modelsoptimal long- term contractrenegotiation game
Related Items (38)
The market for conservation and other hostages ⋮ Contracts and externalities: how things fall apart ⋮ Renegotiation-proof contract in repeated agency ⋮ Price discrimination based on buyers' purchase history ⋮ Dynamic contracting under adverse selection and renegotiation ⋮ MARRIAGE, DIVORCE, AND ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION ⋮ Dynamic price discrimination with customer recognition ⋮ Dynamic contracting under permanent and transitory private information ⋮ Lemons and peaches: multi-stage buying mechanisms with a Devil's Menu ⋮ Repeated contracting without commitment ⋮ Contract design and non-cooperative renegotiation ⋮ Flexible versus committed and specific versus uniform: wholesale price contracting in a supply chain with downstream process innovation ⋮ Dynamic adverse selection with a patient seller ⋮ Introduction to symposium on dynamic contracts and mechanism design ⋮ Communication, renegotiation and coordination with private values ⋮ Optimal equilibrium contracts in the infinite horizon with no commitment across periods ⋮ Short-term contracts and long-term agency relationships ⋮ Optimality and renegotiation in dynamic contracting ⋮ Contracting with imperfect commitment and noisy communication ⋮ Multitrade bargaining ⋮ Price experimentation with strategic buyers ⋮ An infinitely repeated rental model with incomplete information ⋮ Reserve prices in repeated auctions ⋮ Optimal regulation of energy network expansion when costs are stochastic ⋮ Selling or leasing? Dynamic pricing of software with upgrades ⋮ Extracting the information: espionage with double crossing ⋮ Prices, delay, and the dynamics of trade ⋮ Dynamic yardstick mechanisms ⋮ Compromise is key in infinitely repeated bargaining with an evergreen clause ⋮ Perfect Bayesian equilibria in repeated sales ⋮ Screening by mode of trade ⋮ Renegotiation design with multiple regulators ⋮ Starting small and renegotiation ⋮ Endogenous and exogenous commitment ⋮ Dynamic Incentive-Aware Learning: Robust Pricing in Contextual Auctions ⋮ Incentive-Compatible Learning of Reserve Prices for Repeated Auctions ⋮ Imperfect commitment and the revelation principle: The multi-agent case ⋮ The renegotiation-proofness principle and costly renegotiation
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