Self-Enforcing Wage Contracts
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Publication:3795450
DOI10.2307/2297404zbMath0649.90025OpenAlexW2030243732MaRDI QIDQ3795450
Tim Worrall, Jonathan P. Thomas
Publication date: 1988
Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/7f1d50d943fd69ca86f9dd660f156559d6c196eb
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