Strategy Space Reduction in Maskin's Theorem: Sufficient Conditions for Nash Implementation
From MaRDI portal
Publication:3798437
DOI10.2307/1911706zbMath0652.90014OpenAlexW2009984474MaRDI QIDQ3798437
Publication date: 1988
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/1911706
monotonicityNash equilibriumsocial choice correspondencestrategy space reductionimplementabilityno veto powerdispersion of informationacceptable outcomesinformational requirementlower contour setsMaskin's theoremsize of the message space
Related Items (39)
Double implementation in Nash and undominated Nash equilibria in social choice environments ⋮ Nash implementation in production economies ⋮ Divide-and-permute ⋮ Implementation with coalition formation: A complete characterization ⋮ Implementation in generalized matching problems ⋮ Virtual implementation in incomplete information environments with infinite alternatives and types ⋮ Game forms for Nash implementation of general social choice correspondences ⋮ A full characterization of Nash implementation with strategy space reduction ⋮ Picking the winners ⋮ Nash implementation via simple stochastic mechanisms: strategy space reduction ⋮ Outcome-robust mechanisms for Nash implementation ⋮ Reexamination of Maskin's theorem on Nash implementability ⋮ Behavioral implementation under incomplete information ⋮ Trimming extreme reports in preference aggregation ⋮ Feasible Nash Implementation of Social Choice Rules When the Designer Does Not Know Endowments ⋮ Computational implementation ⋮ The weak core of simple games with ordinal preferences: Implementation in Nash equilibrium. ⋮ Ex post implementation ⋮ A local independence condition for characterization of Walrasian allocations rule ⋮ Implementation of the Walrasian correspondence: the boundary problem ⋮ Implementation Theory ⋮ On Nash implementation of social choice correspondences ⋮ On the necessary and sufficient conditions for Nash implementation ⋮ An algorithm for verifying double implementability in Nash and strong Nash equilibria ⋮ The scholarship assignment problem ⋮ Nash implementation of constrained efficient stable matchings under weak priorities ⋮ Implementation by self-relevant mechanisms ⋮ Implementation of solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked ⋮ The unique informational efficiency of the competitive mechanism in economies with production ⋮ Incentives and competitive allocations in exchange economies with incomplete markets ⋮ Nash implementation via mechanisms that allow for abstentions ⋮ Eliciting socially optimal rankings from unfair jurors ⋮ An algorithm for checking strong Nash implementability ⋮ A nonparametric, efficient public good decision mechanism: Undominated Bayesian implementation ⋮ Nash implementation and double implementation: Equivalence theorems ⋮ A new necessary condition for Nash implementation ⋮ A simple and procedurally fair game form for Nash implementation of the No-envy solution ⋮ Self-implementation of social choice correspondences in Nash equilibrium ⋮ Communication requirements and strategic mechanisms for market organization
This page was built for publication: Strategy Space Reduction in Maskin's Theorem: Sufficient Conditions for Nash Implementation
