Justifying the First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems
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Publication:3801283
DOI10.2307/1911363zbMath0654.90001OpenAlexW2074555403MaRDI QIDQ3801283
Publication date: 1988
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/1911363
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