Subgame Perfect Implementation
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Publication:3806949
DOI10.2307/1911364zbMath0657.90005OpenAlexW2089994460WikidataQ56068955 ScholiaQ56068955MaRDI QIDQ3806949
No author found.
Publication date: 1988
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/1911364
implementationpublic goodsubgame perfect equilibriaextensive form gametransferable utility economies
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