Correlated equilibrium and higher order beliefs about play

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2012.05.008zbMath1274.91027OpenAlexW3124325347MaRDI QIDQ380850

Songzi Du

Publication date: 14 November 2013

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825612000814?np=y

zbMATH Keywords

correlated equilibriumhigher-order beliefsintrinsic correlation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10)

Related Items (1)

Correlation and common priors in games with incomplete information

Cites Work

• On redundant types and Bayesian formulation of incomplete information
• Intrinsic correlation in games
• Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies
• Characterizing common priors in the form of posteriors
• Interactive Epistemology and Solution Concepts for Games with Asymmetric Information
• Rationalizability and Correlated Equilibria
• Equilibrium Points of Bimatrix Games

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